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G - MR. JOHNSON

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November 9, 1962

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

NOV 9 1962

THROUGH: S/S

DEPUTY UNDER

FROM: IO - Harlan Cleveland SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Cuba: Phase IV

I mentioned to you the other day the possibility that when the missiles are out and we are approaching the end of Phase II on Cuba, we should think in terms of a wider political initiative to maintain the momentum. This wider initiative might take the form of a Presidential speech at the UN, thus setting the framework for whatever summity might ensue.

I'm attaching a relatively short and readable paper which makes the case for doing this. The kinds of substantive proposals that we could pool together into a single initiative of this character are quite well summarized in the attachments to the planning paper which we have all been working with Walt Rostow to produce.

Perhaps it would be well to focus on this question soon, even though there are many unsettled questions in the Cuban matter as such. Even if we remain indefinitely in Phases I and II as far as Cuba is concerned, I think we will need before long to be in a position to broaden the questions as far as the Soviets - and the rest of the world - are concerned.

COPIES TO: The Under Secretary
G - Mr. Johnson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

IO:HC:mtb

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TEN WHY, WHAT, WHERE, HOW AND WHO OF AN EARLY US POLITICAL INITIATIVE

In light of the immediate status of negotiations re Cuba -- and other highlights in the world picture today -- the United States should consider urgently a ~~broad~~ broad political initiative whose goal would be a continuing shift in world politics in a direction favorable to our long-term interests.

I. WHY?

A. Within the next forty-eight hours or so we can be in a position in which our limited objective in Cuba has been achieved in an acceptable manner but not quite the way we said it should happen. We can be reasonably satisfied that the Russians have, in fact, removed their missiles and that they are not, in fact, shipping other offensive weapons in. The disentangling process, however, was not cheat-proof; the incoming inspection is not leak-proof; our stated objective of on-site inspection is frustrated by Castro; and our non-intervention pledge remains in equivocal status. We could well face an unpleasant Security Council meeting and pressures to note Soviet performance on its part of the bargain and a demand to formalize our part. In this sticky position re Cuba, the United States should not be just standing there doing nothing: it should be moving on other issues and at other levels.

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